The Disciplinary Complaint Against Me and Why I Am Contesting it

If you are considering hiring me and came across a reference to a pending disciplinary complaint, I understand why you might want to know what it is about.

The complaint does not involve dishonesty toward a client, misuse of client funds, or neglect of a client matter. It arises from language I used in appellate advocacy while representing a criminal defendant and from the Disciplinary Commission’s position that portions of that advocacy crossed the line established by Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.2.

I am contesting the complaint. The disciplinary process is ongoing, and no final determination has been made.

Because the matter is public, I believe prospective clients, other lawyers, and members of the public should be able to see both the complaint and my response and understand the legal issue being disputed.

In 2026, the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission filed a disciplinary complaint against me in In the Matter of Brian J. Johnson, Cause No. 26S-DI-00243. The complaint arises from language I used while representing a client before the Indiana Court of Appeals in Marshall v. State, Cause No. 24A-CR-1493.

Because the complaint is a public filing, someone searching my name may encounter it. Anyone who does should also be able to understand my position, review my response, and examine the underlying public record.

The appeal in Marshall involved a search warrant and what I believed were serious problems with the facts presented to obtain that warrant, the testimony offered to defend it, and the appellate court’s treatment of those problems.

After the Court of Appeals ruled against my client, I filed a petition for rehearing. My criticism of the court’s reasoning was severe. That was intentional. I believed the decision had significant consequences for Fourth Amendment protections and for the manner in which courts evaluate inaccurate information presented in support of search warrants.

I did not believe then, and do not believe now, that lawyers are required to soften legitimate criticism of judicial reasoning simply because the criticism is uncomfortable.

The Disciplinary Commission contends that portions of my advocacy violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.2. That rule prohibits a lawyer from making a statement the lawyer knows to be false, or makes with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity, concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge or other adjudicatory officer.

I take that prohibition seriously. Lawyers should not knowingly make false factual accusations against judges. The power to make such accusations carries a corresponding obligation to be truthful.

My disagreement with the complaint concerns where that line is drawn.

I do not believe Rule 8.2 prohibits forceful criticism merely because it is harsh, unwelcome, or capable of diminishing someone’s confidence in a judicial decision. A lawyer may criticize a court’s reasoning, identify what the lawyer believes are the consequences of a decision, and use strong rhetoric in doing so. A lawyer may even be unfair or unnecessarily caustic without making a false statement concerning judicial integrity.

That distinction matters.

Some of the statements challenged in my disciplinary proceeding predicted what I believed would be the consequences of the Court of Appeals’ decision. Policy and consequence arguments are a routine part of appellate advocacy. Saying that a decision will produce a harmful result does not mean that the judges intended that result. A prediction about the consequences of a judicial decision is fundamentally different from a factual accusation about the motives or integrity of the judges who made it.

More fundamentally, Rule 8.2 is a false-statement rule. Before asking whether a lawyer knew something was false or recklessly disregarded its truth or falsity, there must first be an identifiable statement capable of being true or false. Context can reveal that words imply a factual assertion. But context cannot eliminate the need to identify the assertion itself.

That threshold is central to my defense.

There is also a reason the issue matters beyond my own disciplinary proceeding.

Criminal-defense lawyers spend their careers scrutinizing governmental power. We challenge police conduct, prosecutorial decisions, statutes enacted by legislatures, rulings by trial courts, and decisions by appellate courts. Sometimes those challenges are restrained. Sometimes the circumstances call for stronger language.

The responsibility to scrutinize governmental power does not disappear because the governmental official whose actions are being criticized wears a robe rather than a badge.

That responsibility does not give lawyers license to lie about judges. Nor should it. But there is an important difference between knowingly or recklessly making a false factual accusation about a judge and forcefully attacking the reasoning, factual analysis, or consequences of a judicial decision.

The distinction is particularly important because criticism of government often serves a purpose beyond the particular case in which it occurs. Lawyers identify weaknesses in judicial reasoning because those decisions become precedent. We argue about the consequences of decisions precisely because today’s ruling may govern tomorrow’s search, arrest, prosecution, or trial.

I have practiced law for nearly thirty years. I take my professional responsibilities seriously, and I take this disciplinary proceeding seriously. I also believe that defending those responsibilities sometimes requires defending the boundaries of the rules that govern lawyers.

I am therefore contesting the complaint through the disciplinary process. I do not intend to use this website to litigate every allegation or every factual dispute in that proceeding. The relevant filings and judicial decisions can speak for themselves, and the disciplinary process will ultimately determine the result.

But I also will not treat the existence of a pending complaint as an admission that my advocacy constituted professional misconduct.

The broader principle is important to me. Lawyers have substantial responsibilities when they criticize judges, and those responsibilities include honesty and accuracy. Rule 8.2 establishes an important boundary by prohibiting false statements concerning judicial qualifications or integrity when made with the required culpability.

That boundary should remain tied to falsity.

Strong criticism is not necessarily false criticism. A prediction of harmful consequences is not necessarily an accusation of improper motive. And disagreement with the reasoning of a court—even severe disagreement—does not by itself constitute an attack on judicial integrity.

In a constitutional system, criticism is not the enemy of legitimate public confidence. It is one of the means by which that confidence is tested—and earned.

A Note About This Page

This page is intended to explain the nature of the dispute in general terms. My filed Response to the Verified Complaint will set out my legal and factual position more fully and should be consulted for the complete argument.

Public Record

In the Matter of Brian J. Johnson - Cause No. 26S-DI-00243

Verified Complaint — Johnson__Disc_Comp_.pdf



Marshall v. State Cause No. 24A-CR-1493

Brief of Appellant — Brief _ Appellant.pdf

Reply Brief —Brief _ Appellant Reply.pdf

Court of Appeals Opinon — Marshall Opinion.pdf

Petition for Rehearing —Petition for Rehearing _ Appellant.pdf

Petition for Transfer — Petition to Transfer _ Appellant.pdf

Oral Argument - Online

Status: Pending
Last updated: 9/4/26